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Abstract 
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Updates from PA Governor’s Office 
*No new updates this month 
Updates from the PA Legislature 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
House Bill 488 – Protecting Missing Children Cases from 
Negligent Parents/Guardians 
Final Passage in the House, October 5, 2021 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H
&type=B&bn=488 
House Bill 488 would amend Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes 
that “require a report to be made about a missing child within 24 hours after his or her whereabouts 
became unknown, but will also require proof that parent’s silence exhibited a reckless disregard for a 
risk of harm to a child, or for the child’s health, safety, or welfare under the circumstances.” 
House Bill 1736 --- Protecting Arrested Individuals from Having Their Mugshot Photos Commercially 
Published and/or Disseminated 
Final Passage in the House, October 27, 2021 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1736 
 House Bill 1736 would amend Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes 
to create a new offense that “would be triggered any time a person who is engaged in publishing or 
disseminating a booking photograph solicits or accepts a fee or other consideration to remove or modify 
the photograph. A person convicted under this section commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, 
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punishable by up to 2 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $5,000. Any additional fee or 
consideration they receive or solicit is deemed to constitute a separate violation.” 
 
Updates from the Courts 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA  
DECIDED: October 18, 2021 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1539_09m1.pdf 
“Petitioner Daniel Rivas-Villegas, a police officer in Union City, California, responded to a 911 call 
reporting that a woman and her two children were barricaded in a room for fear that respondent 
Ramon Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had 
no way of escaping the house, Rivas-Villegas and the other officers present commanded Cortesluna 
outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s left pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and 
another officer were in the process of removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas 
briefly placed his knee on the left side of Cortesluna’s back. Cortesluna later sued under Rev. Stat. 
§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, as relevant, that Rivas-Villegas used excessive force. At issue here is 
whether Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established 
law.” 
Reversed: The Court of Appeals held that “Rivas-Villegas is not entitled to qualified immunity because 
existing precedent put him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force.” Id., at 654. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied solely on LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F. 3d 
947 (CA9 2000). The court acknowledged that “the officers here responded to a more volatile situation 
than did the officers in LaLonde.” 979 F. 3d, at 654. Nevertheless, it reasoned: “Both LaLonde and this 
case involve suspects who were lying face-down on the ground and were not resisting either physically 
or verbally, on whose back the defendant officer leaned with a knee, causing allegedly significant 
injury.” Ibid. Judge Collins dissented. As relevant, he argued that “the facts of LaLonde are materially 
distinguishable from this case and are therefore insufficient to have made clear to every reasonable 
officer that the force Rivas-Villegas used here was excessive.” Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We agree and therefore reverse. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly 
establishes law for purposes of §1983, LaLonde did not give fair notice to Rivas-Villegas. He is thus 
entitled to qualified immunity.” 
CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND 
DECIDED: October 18, 2021 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1668_new_n7io.pdf 
“On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice’s ex-wife, Joy, called 911. Rollice was in her garage, she explained, 
and he was intoxicated and would not leave. Joy requested police assistance; otherwise, “it’s going to 
get ugly real quick.” 981 F. 3d 808, 812 (CA10 2020). The dispatcher asked whether Rollice lived at the 
residence. Joy said he did not but explained that he kept tools in her garage. Officers Josh Girdner, 
Chase Reed, and Brandon Vick responded to the call. All three knew that Rollice was Joy’s ex-husband, 
was intoxicated, and would not leave her home. Joy met the officers out front and led them to the side 
entrance of the garage. There the officers encountered Rollice and began speaking with him in the 
doorway. Rollice expressed concern that the officers intended to take him to jail; Officer Girdner told 
him that they were simply trying to get him a ride. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands 
and the officers noticed that he appeared nervous. Officer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for 
weapons. Rollice refused. Police body-camera video captured what happened next. As the conversation 
continued, Officer Girdner gestured with his hands and took one step toward the doorway, causing 
Rollice to take one step back. Rollice, still conversing with the officers, turned around and walked 
toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging over a workbench. Officer Girdner followed, 
the others close behind. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The video is silent, but the officers 
stated that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking. He then grabbed a hammer from the back 
wall over the workbench and turned around to face the officers. Rollice grasped the handle of the 
hammer with both hands, as if preparing to swing a baseball bat, and pulled it up to shoulder level. The 
officers backed up, drawing their guns. At this point the video is no longer silent, and the officers can be 
heard yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer. He did not. Instead, Rollice took a few steps to his right, 
coming out from behind a piece of furniture so that he had an unobstructed path to Officer Girdner. He 
then raised the hammer higher back behind his head and took a stance as if he was about to throw the 
hammer or charge at the officers. In response, Officers Girdner and Vick fired their weapons, killing 
Rollice.  
Rollice’s estate filed suit against, among others, Officers Girdner and Vick, alleging that the officers were 
liable under 42 U. S. C. §1983, for violating Rollice’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive 
force. The officers moved for summary judgment, both on the merits and on qualified immunity 
grounds. The District Court granted their motion. Burke v. Tahlequah, 2019 WL 4674316, *6 (ED Okla., 
Sept. 25, 2019). The officers’ use of force was reasonable, it concluded, and even if not, qualified 
immunity prevented the case from going further. Ibid. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an 
officer to be held liable for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the officer’s reckless or 
deliberate conduct created a situation requiring deadly force. Id., at 816. Applying that rule, the Court 
concluded that a jury could find that Officer Girdner’s initial step toward Rollice and the officers’ 
subsequent “cornering” of him in the back of the garage recklessly created the situation that led to the 
fatal shooting, such that their ultimate use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Id., at 823. As to 
qualified immunity, the Court concluded that several cases, most notably Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F. 3d 
837 (CA10 1997), clearly established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. 981 F. 3d, at 826. This 
petition followed.” 
Reversed: “We need not, and do not, decide whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment in the 
first place, or whether recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can itself violate the 
Fourth Amendment. On this record, the officers plainly did not violate any clearly established law. The 
doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009). As we have explained, qualified immunity 
protects “‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” District of Columbia 
v. Wesby, 583 U. S. ___, ___ –___ (2018) (slip op., at 13–14) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 
(1986)). Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identified a single precedent finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation under similar circumstances. The officers were thus entitled to qualified 
immunity. The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to file briefs amici curiae are granted, 
and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.” 
PA Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. AARON BRADLEY 
DECIDED: October 20, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-44-2021mo%20-%20104928486149472312.pdf?cb=1 
“In this appeal by allowance, we consider the procedure for enforcing the right to effective counsel in a 
Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) proceeding. All parties before us acknowledge that the current 
approach is inadequate, and that revisions are in order, but have offered differing viewpoints. For the 
reasons that follow, we determine that, indeed, an overhaul of the procedure to vindicate a petitioner’s 
right to effective PCRA counsel is appropriate, and we adopt the approach described within.” 
IN THE INTEREST OF; T.W., A MINOR 
DECIDED: October 20, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-6-2021mo%20-%20104928255149467701.pdf?cb=1 
“In this appeal by allowance, Appellant, T.W., a minor, appeals from the February 4, 2020 order of the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the July 10, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County denying a motion made by Appellant to suppress physical evidence and 
adjudicating Appellant delinquent for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. As will be discussed 
more fully below, Appellant’s arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance arose from a 
vehicle stop and a subsequent Terry frisk. Upon frisking Appellant, a police officer of the Philadelphia 
Police Department felt a hard object in Appellant’s left pants pocket. Fearing that the unknown object 
could be a weapon, the officer reached into Appellant’s pocket and removed the object. Appellant was 
arrested for possessing the object and a subsequent search incident to arrest led to the discovery of a 
controlled substance on Appellant’s person. Before trial, Appellant made a motion to suppress the 
physical evidence recovered from his person, arguing that the police officer exceeded the scope of a 
permissible Terry frisk by reaching into Appellant’s pocket and removing an object during the frisk. We 
granted review in this matter to address the standards by which a police officer may remove an object 
from within a suspect’s clothing during a Terry frisk. 
In the present case, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude Officer Grant had a reasonable suspicion 
that the object in Appellant’s left pants pocket was a weapon. Therefore, Officer Grant did not exceed 
the scope of a permissible Terry frisk by reaching into and removing an object from Appellant’s pocket. 
Accordingly, we affirm the February 4, 2020 order of the Superior Court.” 
PA Superior Court 
(Reporting only cases with precedential value)  
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ALFONSO SANCHEZ 
FILED: October 4, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A17018-21o%20-%20104912696148115134.pdf?cb=1 
“Appellant, Alfonso Sanchez, appeals from the order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common 
Pleas, which denied his second motion to dismiss the charges against him based on double jeopardy 
grounds. We affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MAURICE GREEN 
FILED: October 7, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S09030-21o%20-%20104917295148520484.pdf?cb=1 
“Maurice Green (“Green”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions of 
one count each of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on public 
street in Philadelphia, possessing instruments of crime, and recklessly endangering another person.1 We 
reverse and remand for a new trial.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLAVNIA v. TOD A. GALLAGHER 
FILED: October 12, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-E02005-21o%20-%20104920430148806833.pdf?cb=1 
“The Commonwealth appeals from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas’ order of suppression. This 
matter, which is before the Court en banc after this Court granted reargument, raises an important 
question as to what police must do to obtain a knowing and voluntary consent to search by permission 
all or part of a cellular phone’s data. The Commonwealth argues that it established that Appellee Tod A. 
Gallagher (Gallagher) gave such consent and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Because the 
Commonwealth has not established meaningful consent to the invasive search it performed, we affirm.” 
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v ERNEST GOODS 
FILED: October 13, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A15007-21o%20-%20104922085148950536.pdf?cb=1 
“Ernest Goods appeals from the order that denied his motion to dismiss based upon double jeopardy.1 
We reverse the order and remand with directions that Appellant be discharged.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TERRY BOWENS 
FILED: October 19, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-E03006-20o%20-%20104928109149444071.pdf?cb=1 
“Terry Bowens appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after he was convicted of multiple drug 
and firearms offenses. We granted en banc review to address whether the collection of data from a cell 
phone that was in police custody, undertaken more than two days after the issuance of the warrant that 
authorized its search, required suppression of the information obtained. Upon review of that issue and 
others raised by Appellant, we discern no cause to disturb the trial court’s suppression ruling and affirm 
Appellant’s judgment of sentence.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE JAVIER DEJESUS 
FILED: October 20, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-E01006-21o%20-%20104929304149525413.pdf?cb=1 
“Appellant, Jose Javier DeJesus, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered on January 5, 2018, 
resentencing him to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for a Second-Degree Murder he 
committed as a juvenile. Relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), he challenges the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence and the 
discretionary aspects of his sentence. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. 
Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), we conclude that Appellant’s LWOP sentence is constitutional. 
Further, because Appellant did not invoke our jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of his 
sentence, he has waived his challenge to the sentencing court’s consideration of mitigating factors. We, 
thus, affirm.” 
